The article provides a conceptualisation of the link between recent migration flows and labour market uncertainty through the analysis of a critical example, the construction sector (characterised by economic volatility, worker mobility, employment insecurity, safety risk) in the UK and Spain (countries with large immigration, flexible labour markets and volatile construction sectors). Transnational labour mobility can be seen as a structural response to recent European dilemmas on how to combine flexibility and security, through the creation of a hyper-flexible buffer of migrant workers who, being disposable in case of downturn, can carry most of the uncertainty burden without causing political problems. This raises two issues: the social sustainability of such segmentation, in particular with regard to occupational health and safety, and the role organised labour can have on it, in particular in organising such workers. The issues are analysed through labour market statistics and interviews with unionists, migrant organisation representatives, employers and employment policy officers in both countries.
Introduction
Recent cross-border movement of workers in Europe, especially between old and new member states of the European Union, is characterised by high circular mobility, which does not correspond to the technical definition of migration, i.e. permanence abroad for over a year (nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we will use the word migrants). Its specificities in terms of transationality, flexibility and high employment rates make this phenomenon an interesting development for European labour markets, possibly approximating them to the long-invoked American model of high flexibility and mobility. In particular, foreign labour, thanks to its mobility, may play the function of 'buffer' in relation to employment uncertainty, carrying a burden of insecurity that local European populations are unwilling to bear. Such development raises questions of social sustainability and of the role organised labour can have in regulating and possibly organising this flux of workers.
The economic crisis that started in 2008 suddenly highlighted the social problems connected to new international mobility of workers. The issue of social sustainability of highly mobile migration has therefore emerged.
This article discusses how far recent European migration has played the role of flexible 'buffer', if such role is socially sustainable, and what role organised labour can have towards it. To do so, it will focus on the case of the construction sector in Spain and the UK. The construction sector, with its inherently mobile workers and places of production, seasonality, and relevance of employment as well as safety risk, is an extreme case of link between migration and flexibility, especially in the light of the recession of 2008-09. Amongst the EU large countries, Spain and UK have been particularly hit by the crisis in the construction industry, and both had experienced large increases of immigration in the preceding period, although from different origins: especially Poland, Slovakia and Baltic states to the UK, as against Latin America, Morocco and Romania in Spain. In the UK accurate representative 4 data are missing, but it is estimated that the number of foreign workers in the construction sector before the last recession accounted for at least 10% of the sector's employment, and above 30% in London (Clarke 2010). In Spain, social security data indicate that they were 30%. In both countries, trade unions have avoided exclusionary standpoints towards these workers, have provided services to them, and tried to reduce their extreme vulnerability, but still lack resources and clear strategies to organise them.
The article proceeds as follows. Firstly, the theoretical link between labour market uncertainty and migration is explored through the analysis of literature, reports and data.
Secondly, the case selection and methodology are presented. Thirdly, we describe the role of migrants in the two construction sectors, in particular during the recent crisis. Fourthly, we address the issue of social sustainability of migration in construction through the important aspect of occupational health and safety. Fifthly, we compare the union responses in the two countries. We then conclude on the viability of the use of migration as labour market buffer.
Recent migration: a solution to Euro-sclerosis?
The growing link between migration and employment precariousness has been highlighted recently by sociologists, economists and migration experts alike (e.g. Crouch 2011 , Standing 2009 , Anderson 2010 . Since the early 1990s, European employment policies have been characterised by the dilemma of how to increase flexibility in a socially sustainable way, which was best portrayed by the new term 'flexicurity'. Cross-border worker mobility, especially but not only within the EU, offers a possible solution to the problem of combining flexibility and security: the creation of a hyper-flexible buffer of migrant workers who, being disposable in case of downturn, can carry most of the uncertainty burden without causing political problems. The result of such a solution would be a novel form of segmentation, primarily by employment security and flexibility rather than just wage or working conditions. Until the 1990s, immigration into the richer western European countries until the 1990s was characterised by a tendency to settle locally and permanently, despite the theoretically temporary nature of 'Gastarbeiter' schemes, and by relatively low activity rates, especially female. The more recent movement, however, is characterised by more frequent movement, often of a transnational nature, and higher labour market participation.
Recent European immigration is essentially labour migration. Just before the economic crisis, in the old EU member states, the activity rate of new member states' citizens was, at 78%, much higher than that of nationals (67%) and of non-EU born (66%) (EC 2008) . Cheap transport links and the near-absence of border controls make circulatory and short-term, unplanned migration possible. The official European Union's view of recent intra-EU worker mobility has been extremely positive (European Commission 2006a , 2006b , 2008 : the free movement of workers has helped GDP growth and inflation control in the host countries, and It would be simplistic to see intra-EU mobility as just a strategy, by governments and employers, to lower labour costs and weaken trade unions, according to the traditional Marxist view of the 'reserve army' (Castles and Kosack 1973) . In fact, wages seem to have been affected only marginally in the EU15, even in sectors with most new foreign workers (Brücker et al. 2009 ). In any case, in Western Europe already for a while real wages had been stagnant, and unions declining: so there was no urgent need, for EU employers, to import foreign labour to stop wage or union growth. Sommers and Woolfson (2008) have argued that by recurring to mass migration, the EU is aping the US growth model of the last thirty years, based on the attraction of cheap and flexible foreign labour. But more than low costs, the specific attractive feature of the new labour supply relies exactly in their 'mobility', which offers a corrective to the long-blamed 'sclerosis' of European labour markets.
Migration experts have noticed that the EU has an 'almost desperate structural need, in both demographic and labour force terms, for increased intra-European population movements' (Favell 2008: 704) . Geographic mobility is much lower in the EU than in the US (Krieger and Fernandez 2006) . Moreover, despite nearly a decade of 'flexicurity' promotion, labour market flexibility meets, in Europe, clear social, political and economic barriers. Not only did the governments of France, Italy and Germany encounter mass protests over their labour market reforms. The financial crisis demonstrated that labour market uncertainty is a problem for the economy as well, as it inhibits responsible credit, confident consumption and thereby depresses demand (Crouch 2011) . In this perspective, transnational employee mobility can appear as the optimal solution within a segmented labour market, where the burden of uncertainty is allocated to workers from new migrants.
These workers share a number of positive (from the employers' perspective) characteristics of migrants in general, as described in the founding work by Piore (1979) : they are adaptable and mobile; used to long-hour and flexible employment regimes; more sensitive to monetary incentives and less sensitive to prestige considerations; and not part of the polity and therefore governments can largely ignore their opinions. But they also have an additional 'asset' in comparison to previous immigrants into the EU: they tend to be temporary. As
Piore had put it, 'it is chiefly the temporary character of the migration stream that makes these migrations (…) of value to industrial society' (Piore 1979: 52) . In fact, recent research in Britain has disclosed employer strategies involving the frequent replacement of migrant nationality groups, in an even deeper form of segmentation than Piore had expected (MacKenzie and Forde 2009). In the case of intra-EU migrants, geographic proximity and the existence of at least some social security or family safety net in the countries of origin, enable these workers to display very high activity rates, to return home in case of job loss, and not to bring their dependants along. In addition to voluntary mobility, a more extreme form of transnational flexibility is achieved through the 'posting of workers', which is increasingly use to temporarily move cheap labour from the new member states to the West, especially in agriculture and construction (Cremers 2011) . To summarise, recent migratory movement in the EU, despite different regulations, presents resemblances with the intra-NAFTA, insofar as both differ from traditional postcolonial, guestworker and asylum migrations, and tend to lead to exploitative dual labour markets (Favell 2008 ).
Yet a number of questions arise. First, are these new migrant workers really so flexible and mobile? Secondly, if they are segregated in the most insecure jobs, is such segregation socially sustainable in the long term, i.e. resistant to socialisation, but also not feeding social unrest or inter-community tensions? Moreover, is it sustainable for the workers themselves?
As the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions has 8 admitted (Krieger and Fernandez 2006) , mobility comes at big social costs for the workers themselves and their families. And thirdly, what role can trade unions have in this process?
Can they accommodate such segregation, as a form of indirect protection of national workers' more secure position, or can they act as a socialisation bridge, narrowing the gap between national and foreign employees?
The early experience of intra-EU migration after EU enlargement seem to confirm that workers from the EU10 have occupied precarious labour market positions in all EU15
countries, including those that did not open their borders to them. As the global recession started, Woolfson and Likic-Brboric (2008) suggested that these migrants are carrying an unequal burden of 'toxic' risk, in terms of both precarity and dangerous working conditions.
The economic sectors affected most severely by the crisis (construction, manufacturing, finance and travel-related services) employ high numbers of foreigners, making it reasonable to expect migrants to pay a higher cost than average (Martin 2009 ). This is also true for non- with a period of fast growth especially in the construction industry, which doubled its share of employment from 6.9% to 11%. Employment in the sector increased from 1.2m to 2.8m in that period.
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The Spanish labour market achieved flexibility through segmentation and notably the large The share of unskilled workers (peones) among immigrants was double that among Spanish nationals (30% vs 15%). Immigration in Spain was characterised, before the crisis, by high employment rates and high geographic mobility, especially in the agriculture and construction sectors (Pumares et al. 2008) . Spain, like other Mediterranean countries, is also characterised by a large share of undeclared economy, which itself attracts immigration, and in particular undocumented immigration.
UK
The British labour market is unique among the 'old' EU member states for its low collective bargaining coverage, low employment protection and light working time regulation. Low employment protection results in limited need for temporary contracts. A distinctive extreme form of flexibility is achieved through Temporary Employment Agencies, more important than in the rest of the EU and involving no employment security at all, even in case of pregnancy.
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The British migration policy in the decade before the economic crisis was clearly driven by employers' flexibility needs (Menz 2010) . In the construction sector, use of migrant labour has also been due to national underinvestment in training (Clarke 2010).
Immigrants occupy the lowest strata in the British labour market, receive the lowest average pay of all migrant groups (Clark and Drinkwater 2008) 
Constructing insecure workers
The flexible buffer function of migrant labour can be tested in the case of the recession in construction, during which sector employment fell from 2.8m to 1.7m in Spain, and from 2.4m to 2.1m in the UK (Table 1 ). In Spain, the crisis has impacted migrant construction workers more than anybody else. Between 2008 and 2009 total employment in Spain employment fell by 7%, and in construction by 23% (LFS data). According to the Migration Survey of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (that is carried out simultaneously to the Labour Force Survey), 14% foreign workers in the whole economy, and as many as 64% of foreign workers in construction lost their jobs. Of those foreign workers who lost their construction jobs, only 12% had found jobs in other sectors of the Spanish labour market.
[ (Coleman 2010) . As in Spain, the gap in employment elasticity between nationals and immigrants is larger in construction than in the whole economy (Table 1 ). The real gap may be much larger due to the underestimation of foreign workers in constructions, where LFS data are collected from households and migrants are often not detected, in comparison to manufacturing, where they are collected from employers, and show a faster employment fall.
Our interviews, combined with national reports, reveal both similarities and differences in the patterns of segregation and unequal distribution of uncertainty between national and foreign workers in the industry. In the UK fragmented economic structure, segregation occurs mostly by subsector and company. Foreign workers work mostly in smaller construction sites, for Interviewees overwhelmingly confirm that H&S risk is probably higher for migrant workers in both countries.
In the UK, a Unite officer states that 'our members repeat that they need to be more careful A further H&S implication is the domino effect on the countries of origin. Polish construction unionists remember that after massive emigration of skilled construction sector workers started during the recession of 2001 (at that time, mostly towards Germany), the overall skill level, and therefore risk awareness, on Polish building sites declined, a process later magnified by the replacement with migrants from the Ukraine and other eastern countries.
Union responses
Unions could in theory choose to accommodate segmentation, to protect the national workforce, or oppose it to avoid downwards competition on employment conditions. Actual union policies, though, are strongly influenced by different institutional contexts. In the rest of construction in the UK collective bargaining is largely decentralised and coverage is around 30%, while union density is around 16%. Typically, union organising in UK construction occurs through local job site protests around specific issues (Lillie and Greer 2007) . In addition, the construction-sector union UCATT (Union of Construction, Allied
Trades and Technicians) has made attempts at organising foreign workers, notably through community organising and with Polish organisers in collaboration with Polish trade unions, and started a Migrant Workers and then a Vulnerable Workers' advice projects. Interestingly, the Vulnerable Workers policy (in theory targeted to both nationals and migrants) replaced the Migrant Workers one, also because among union members there was some resentment at devoting resources to foreign workers specifically. The union also admits that, given low resources, servicing, especially if in part publicly funded, is more viable than organising. In this regard, there are regional differences, with the London area already permeated by foreign construction workers (at least 30% of the total) and a considerable presence of irregular employment, and the North used to more regulated and unionised employment relations, and lower share of migrant workers. In the former, organising of migrant workers is quite important (e.g. of Romanians and Poles), and in the case of the Olympic Games construction sites tensions have been avoided through the pre-emptive negotiation of 'Principles of Cooperation' that guarantee the respect of collective agreements, thereby eliminating fears of undercutting, and promote local employment through apprentices and collaboration with the local communities. In the North, instead, despite inclusive efforts (Fitzgerald 2009), a Unite officer admits that, especially after the Lindsey case, the attitude of foreign workers is hostile to the trade unions, and even Poles, despite some union attempts at involving them, rarely join the unions and there still are no Polish reps, while there are some in other regions such as
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Scotland and London. This is confirmed by the Polish construction union Budowlani, saying that co-operation with British trade unions is actually more difficult than with the German ones, despite the 'openness' of the UK labour market and innovative transnational union cooperation projects (Hardy and Fitzgerald 2010) .
With regard to collective bargaining, in Spain the problem is not so much ensuring collective bargaining coverage, but controlling that foreign workers are placed on the construction sector pay scale and not, by exploiting their lack of knowledge, on the lower metalworking sector pay scale (a difference of about €3,000 per year). Even when paid the legal rates, foreign workers tend to miss out on the local going rates, which tend to be 20-30% higher (Cremers 2011) . In both countries, a frequent issue of concern is checking the job grading of foreign workers, and in both countries foreign workers appear to be affected by strong pay flexibility despite sector collective agreements and despite concomitant employment flexibility. In the UK unions report that foreign workers accept pay reductions of up to 33%
following the recession, and in Spain the employer themselves mention reductions in excess of 25% (interviews).
Conclusion
New migrants' situation of uncertainty is one of maximum risk and minimum 'voice'. Our review of the construction sector in the flexible labour markets of Spain and UK illustrates that the exacerbation of mobility and flexibility is realising something feared by UK migration experts: the 'risk that a constantly self-replacing stream of workers [from the new EU member states] could fall into the role of semi-exploited (if often compliant) 'underclass', with limited prospects for social mobility and integration' (Sumption and Somerville 2010, 29) .
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Such a situation may respond to European labour markets' structural quest for more flexibility, but raises important issues of social sustainability. Our sector perspective has revealed convergence between the British and the Spanish models towards a similar use of 'hyperflexible' migrant labour, which is very hard to organise for the trade unions. The more volatile Spanish construction sector exacerbates the problems, as visible on H&S.
National differences in union structures have important consequences, though. Stronger stateunion relations in Spain result in more inclusive political action and servicing towards immigrants by Spanish unions. By contrast, the multi-cultural, pluralist nature of the UK labour market and public sphere result in British trade unions paying more attention to linguistic diversity and community organising. In both cases, unions emerge, rather than as barriers as some media distortion and some insider-outsider view of the labour market suggest, as crucial bridges to avoid migrant segregation. But also, they still appear to be still very unsteady bridges, not yet sure to resist the torrent of flexibility. 
